Abstract-We present a hierarchical model for assessing an object-oriented program's security. Security is quantified using structural properties of the program code to identify the ways in which 'classified' data values may be transferred between objects. The model begins with a set of low-level security metrics based on traditional design characteristics of object-oriented classes, such as data encapsulation, cohesion and coupling. These metrics are then used to characterise higher-level properties concerning the overall readability and writability of classified data throughout the program. In turn, these metrics are then mapped to wellknown security design principles such as 'assigning the least privilege' and 'reducing the size of the attack surface'. Finally, the entire program's security is summarised as a single security index value. These metrics allow different versions of the same program, or different programs intended to perform the same task, to be compared for their relative security at a number of different abstraction levels. The model is validated via an experiment involving five open source Java programs, using a static analysis tool we have developed to automatically extract the security metrics from compiled Java bytecode.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software quality attributes have been studied extensively including maintainability, performance, reusability and reliability [1] . However, one of the most important program attributes, which has received relatively little attention, is information security. Here we interpret 'security' to mean control over data confidentiality, i.e., the ability to read classified values, and data integrity, i.e., the ability to update classified variables. Both of these properties concern the (potential) flow of classified data.
Some previous studies have defined metrics to measure the security of programs. These include metrics which assess security at the abstract system architecture level [2] , at the design phase [3] [4] and at the low level of program code [5] . However, none of this work to date is capable of measuring the overall security of a given program with respect to information flow.
Here we present a new hierarchical model capable of assessing the overall security of a given object-oriented program based on a static analysis of its code building on our previously-published metrocs for UML class designs [3] [4] . The model consists of four hierarchical levels: (1) the potential flow of 'classified' data values between objects, (2) the overall readability and writability of classified data, (3) adherence to standard security design principles, and (4) a total assessment of the program's security. Each of the top three levels aggregates metrics from the level below, allowing the programmer to view the program's security at whatever level of abstraction is desired. The metrics allow different versions of the same program, or different programs intended to do the same job, to be easily compared for their relative security.
To make the metrics easy to assess, we have developed a static analysis tool which can analyse compiled Java bytecode to produce metrics at all four levels of abstraction. By way of validation, we also present the results of an experiment in which the metrics were used to assess the relative security of successive versions of five open-source, security-critical Java programs.
II. RELATED WORK
Although much work has been done on software metrics relatively few attempts have been made to quantify the security of a given program. Chowdhury et al. defined a number of security metrics for assessing the security of a given class based on individual properties of its source code such as the number of calls between methods in the class [5] . However, this type of metric does not account for the interactions between classes and therefore the overall program's security. Similarly, in other work they showed how existing metrics can act as predictors of security vulnerabilities [6] .
Bansiya and Davis developed an assessment framework to measure the quality of object-oriented designs [1] . It maps low-level design details (e.g., program size and complexity) to higher-level quality attributes such as functionality and reusability in order to identify the total quality measure of a given object-oriented design. Even though their study covered most design quality attributes, they did not consider information security. Nevertheless, the approach is a sound one, and we use it in our work.
There are also a few models which aim to quantify the overall security of programs. One of these is the 'system vulnerability index' which quantifies the overall security of a system based on its higher-level characteristics such as potentially neglectful acts [7] . Another is Alhazmi and Ray's approach which defines the security of a program based on its vulnerability density [8] . To be effective, this technique have also defined a measurement of program security based on the various ways a program might be attacked, as determined by its design artefacts, including channels and data [2] . However, none of these approaches directly consider data-flow security of a program based on its design, as we do.
Our approach instead provides a hierarchical model and tool for quantifying the security of whole object-oriented programs, taking into account the interactions between classes and the flow of classified data at the level of individual methods and even individual statements. This is done by defining metrics that measure how "classified" data values may flow between fields, methods and classes. The metrics are defined at the Java source code level, although the static-analysis support tool that performs the calculations works on compiled Java bytecode, so that we can analyse programs for which the source code is not available. In particular, this paper shows how large numbers of low-level metrics can be aggregated to give the programmer an easy-to-understand assessment of the whole program's security.
III. THE SECURITY ASSESSMENT MODEL
In this section, we explain how our hierarchical security assessment model provides a simple and transparent approach for assessing the relative security of object-oriented programs. The model can provide guidance for the development of secure programs using a bottom-up approach. It ensures that attention is given to lower-level detail in an object oriented program such as the number of security-critical attributes and methods. This in turn produces a measurement of a program's security in terms of its higher-level data flow properties.
The model for assessing the security of a given objectoriented program is shown in Figure 1 . Each of its four levels defines a set of metrics for the security of a given program at a certain abstraction level. The bottom level defines numerous specific security metrics from the perspective of the potential flow of classified fields in classes. The next level defines security from the perspective of the overall readability and writability of classified data. The next level up measures security with respect to well-known security design principles widely cited in the literature. Finally, the top level provides a single security measurement which summarises the total security of the entire program, allowing it to be compared easily with other similar programs. Each of the higher-level sets of metrics is defined based on those metrics at the level beneath it.
A. Metrics for the Potential Flow of Classified Data
This section presents the bottom level of the model shown in Figure 1 . It briefly summarises our basic security metrics for assessing the security of a given object-oriented program with regard to the way its object-oriented design properties (data encapsulation, cohesion, composition, coupling, extensibility, design size and inheritance) influence the accessibility of any classified data it contains. These metrics were developed after studying guidelines for writing secure program code [9] [10] . Therefore, they aim to discover many of the vulnerabilities associated with writing insecure code. Most of these metrics were defined for Unified Modeling Language designs in previous work [3] [4]. Here we adapt and extend those definitions for Java program code.
Specifically, these metrics assess the accessibility of classified data items with regard to potential data or control flow. Initially, we rely on the programmer to label those attributes that (may) contain 'classified' values. Then, the tool automatically determines other attributes (fields) whose values may also be influenced by this 'classified' data. We consider a method to be classified if it is has been labelled as 'classified' by the programmer or it interacts with (reads or writes) at least one classified attribute. In particular a programmer may label a method classified to indicate that it returns data read from a high-security external input stream or file. We also consider a class to be 'critical' if it contains attributes labelled as classified or it has an attribute which may derive its value from a 'classified' attribute.
The data encapsulation-based metrics (CIDA, CCDA, COA and RPB) assess the direct accessibility of classified attributes and methods [3] as well as data accessibility through reflection. The cohesion-based metrics (CAIW, CAAI, CAIW, CMW and CWMP) measure the potential flow of classified attributes' values to accessor, mutator and writing methods, penalising programs with a large amount of classified flow [3] . The coupling-based metric (CCC) measures interactions between classes and classified attributes, rewarding programs that minimise such interactions [4] , because it has been proven that strong coupling makes security attacks easier [11] . The composition-based metric (CPCC) rewards programs that use private inner classes for holding classified data, and penalises the use of outer classes for this purpose [4] . The extensibilitybased metrics (CCE, CME, UACA, UCAM and UCAC) reward programs with fewer opportunities for extending critical classes or classified methods, and penalise unused classified attributes, methods or critical classes. These are points at which an attacker can access classified data without affecting the system's observable behaviour [12] . The inheritance-based metrics (CSP, CSI, CMI and CAI) reward programs with fewer opportunities for inheriting from critical superclasses, since these allow subclasses to gain privileges over classified 
CIDA Classified Instance Data Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified instance attributes to the number of classified attributes in the program.
CCDA Classified Class Data Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified class attributes to the number of classified attributes in the program.
COA Classified Operation Accessibility
The ratio of the number of non-private classified methods to the number of classified methods in the program. RPB Reflection Package Boolean A boolean value representing whether the Java program imports the reflection package (1) or not (0).
CMAI Classified Mutator Attribute Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between mutators and classified attributes to the possible maximum number of interactions between mutators and classified attributes in the program.
CAAI Classified Accessor Attribute Interactions
The ratio of the sum of all interactions between accessors and classified attributes to the possible maximum number of interactions between accessors and classified attributes in the program.
CAIW Classified Attributes Interaction Weight
The ratio of the number of all interactions with classified attributes to the total number of all interactions with all attributes in the program.
CMW Classified Methods Weight
The ratio of the number of classified methods to the total number of methods in the program.
CWMP Classified Writing Methods Proportion
The ratio of the number of methods which write classified attributes to the total number of classified methods in the program.
CCC Critical Classes Coupling
The ratio of the number of all classes' links with classified attributes to the total number of possible links with classified attributes in the program.
CPCC Composite-Part Critical Classes
The ratio of the number of critical composed-part classes to the total number of critical classes in the program.
CCE Critical Classes Extensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised critical classes in program to the total number of critical classes in the program.
CME Classified Methods Extensibility
The ratio of the number of the non-finalised classified methods in program to the total number of classified methods in the program.
UACA Unaccessed Assigned Classified Attribute
The ratio of the number of classified attributes that are assigned but never used to the total number of classified attributes in the program.
UCAM Uncalled Classified Accessor Method
The ratio of the number of classified methods that access a classified attribute but are never called by other methods to the total number of classified methods in the program.
UCAC Unused Critical Accessor Class
The ratio of the number of classes which contain classified methods that access classified attributes but are never used by other classes to the total number of critical classes in the program.
CDP Critical Design Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical classes to the total number of classes in the program.
CSCP Critical Serialized Classes Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical serialized classes to the total number of critical classes in the program.
CSP Critical Superclasses Proportion
The ratio of the number of critical superclasses to the total number of critical classes in the program's inheritance hierarchy.
CSI Critical Superclasses Inheritance
The ratio of the sum of classes which may inherit from each critical superclass to the number of possible inheritances from all critical classes in the program's inheritance hierarchy.
CMI Classified Methods Inheritance
The ratio of the number of classified methods which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total number of classified methods in the program's inheritance hierarchy.
CAI Classified Attributes Inheritance
The ratio of the number of classified attributes which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total number of classified attributes in the program's inheritance hierarchy.
data [4] . The design size-based metrics (CDP and CSCP) reward programs with a lower proportion of critical classes [4] and critical serialized classes. Finally, we at this level consider absolute security metrics which count the number of classified attributes (CAT), classified methods (CMT) and critical classes (CCT) in a program. Many metrics are ratios, so in situations where the program does not have the relevant constructs or features, which would produce a zero denominator in a metric, the whole metric is treated as zero.
The full collection of metrics is shown in Table I . Some measure obvious ways of directly reading from or writing to a classified attribute or field in a program. Others measure less obvious forms of data flow such as writing a classified value to an external device or file, serializing a class containing a classified value, or assigning a value to a classified attribute but not subsequently reading it (which allows a malicious programmer to add code to access the value without changing the program's observable behaviour). Each relative metric has been scaled to fit within the range 0 to 1 with lower values indicating more secure code. In addition, informative absolute measures such as the total number of classes which contain security-critical data are also included. Further detail on the rationale for these metrics can be found elsewhere [3] [4].
B. Metrics for the Readability and Writability of Classified Data
The large number of primitive metrics in Table I can make it difficult for the programmer to gain an understanding of a program's overall security. Therefore, the second level of metrics in our hierarchy summarises these metrics with regard to the essential properties of the readability and writability of classified data. As shown in Table II , there are seven distinct metrics at this level: readability of classified attributes, writability of classified attributes, readability via classified methods, writability via classified methods, readability via critical classes and writability via critical classes, plus the absolute measurements. These metrics sum the low-level, data-flow metrics within relevant, non-overlapping security classifications. This allows us to produce a smaller, more easily understood, set of security metrics which still contains sufficient information to give an accurate measure of a program's security. For example, data flow security metrics which are mainly concerned with measuring a classified attribute's direct readability (i.e., CIDA, CCDA and CAI) are mapped to the readability of classified attributes classification. Those security metrics which measure ways in which a classified data value can be accessed via a method that reads that attribute or reads from an external source of classified data (i.e., COA, CME and CMI) are mapped to the readability via classified methods classification, and similarly for metrics relevant to the readability of classified data via operations that access the critical class containing it (i.e., RPB, CPCC, CCE, CDP and CSP). The other higherlevel metrics aggregate those metrics whose main goal is to give a measurement of the direct writability of a classified attribute (i.e., CMAI, CAAI and UACA), those that concern writability via classified methods (i.e., CAIW, CMW, CWMP and UCAM), and those that measure writability via a critical class (i.e., CCC, UCAC, CSCP and CSI). The seventh classification sums the absolute measurements which quantify the total number of classified attributes and methods, and the total number of critical classes in the entire program.
However, not all of these seven classifications may be considered equally important. Therefore, each sum is weighted as per the right-hand column in Table II , so that metrics which measure direct accessibility of classified data are given higher weights than those that measure indirect accessibility of classified values.
C. Metrics for Specific Security Design Principles
This section presents the third level from the bottom in our pyramid-like hierarchical model. Numerous 'security design principles' have been published in the literature for developing and assessing security-critical systems [13] Although these principles were generally not developed with software analysis in mind, we contend that several of them can be helpful in gaining an intuitive understanding of the overall security of a program. Therefore the metrics at this level group the readability and writability metrics to produce metrics relevant to particular design principles as shown in Table III . Seven relevant security design principles were chosen to measure the security of Java programs: assign least privilege, reduce the size of the attack surface, isolation, economy of mechanism, use the least common mechanism, secure the weakest link and fail-safe defaults. Each of these was then quantified as the sum of relevant readability and writability metrics. In this case, however, some lower-level readability and writability metrics appear more than once since they cannot be uniquely mapped to the design principles.
Grant least privilege: The principle of granting the least privilege means "programs and users should run with the least privilege to complete their job" [13] . The main purpose of this principle is to minimize the interactions among privileged users [13] . To adhere to this principle, systems must restrict the privileges of their users to the least possible. For objectoriented programs, this means a program that has the necessary functionality but whose methods can do the fewest possible actions is the most secure. In our case, a program whose critical data is writable from the fewest attributes, and by the fewest methods and classes is considered to be a secure program with respect to this principle.
Reduce the Attack Surface: The principle of reducing the size of the attack surface aims to limit access to secret data. Howard identified several techniques to reduce the attack surface size of a given system, including reducing the amount of running code and reducing access to entry points [9] . For our purposes, this means a program should have the fewest possible readable classified attributes, classified methods and critical classes. It should also mean that there are as few methods as possible that can write classified data externally. Secure the Weakest Link: According to Viega and McGraw, one way to meet the principle of securing the weakest link is to limit the capabilities of technical support as much as possible by reducing functionalities. As a result of having less functionality, a program would have less security exposure [14] . In our case, a program with the fewest writable classified attributes and methods would satisfy the requirement of this principle.
Fail-Safe Defaults: Bishop defines this principle to mean "unless a subject is given explicit access to an object, it should be denied access to that object" [15] . This principle aims to reduce the capabilities of individual classes with regard to the readability of critical data. Hence, for a program to adhere to this principle, each class should have the fewest classified attributes and methods which can access classified data.
Least Common Mechanism: The principle of least common mechanism means that a mechanism used to access resources should not be shared [15] . This principle indicates that critical data can be transmitted to unauthorised parties through shared resources, and so such sharing should be minimised [15] . In our case, this means that an object-oriented program with the least readability and writability of critical classes would adhere to the requirement of this principle.
Isolation: The principle of isolation's main goal is to minimise the amount of potential damage to a system via enforcement of security privileges [14] . To achieve this goal, we have to consider two aspects. One is breaking up the system into small subsystems [9] . The second is to isolate code which has security privileges [9] . In our case, an objectoriented program which has the least writability of critical classes would adhere to the security principle of isolation.
Economy of Mechanism: The economy of mechanism principle is defined by Bishop as "security mechanisms should be as simple as possible" [15] . This principle is important during the software design process due to the fact that unintended information flow paths could result from a complex design [13] . This complexity could result in design and implementation errors which make the entire system or part of it more vulnerable. For our purposes, a program with the fewest numbers of classified attributes and methods, and the fewest number of critical classes would satisfy the economy of mechanism principle.
To define security design principle metrics in terms of the readability and writability metrics, we reviewed each of these principles in the context of their significance for program design. This analysis showed that the least privilege principle is associated with all of the writability measurements while the attack surface principle is linked to all of the readability metrics. Furthermore, securing the weakest link is concerned with minimising the writability of security critical attributes and functions, and hence it is linked to the classified attributes and methods readability metrics. On the other hand, the fail-safe defaults principle aims to reduce the readability of attributes and functions, therefore it can be linked to the classified attributes and methods readability metrics. The least common mechanism principle is associated with the critical classes' readability and writability metrics. However, isolation aims to reduce the amount of writability within classes, and hence it is associated with the critical classes writability metric. Finally, economy of mechanism's main goal is to minimise the amount of critical data in the program. This means that the absolute security metric is the best one for this requirement. As shown in Table III the metric for each security design principle is then simply the sum of the relevant readability and writability metrics.
D. A Total Security Index
Finally, we define the highest level of our model to be a single Total Security Index (TSI) for a whole program. This index provides a simple way to compare the relevant security of entire object-oriented programs based on information obtained from lower-level security metrics. The TSI is simply the sum of the security design principle metrics, as shown in Table IV .
Of course, as we go higher in our hierarchy, the number of metrics is reduced, but they also become less discerning. This is inevitable in such a model. In practice therefore, significant decisions should not be made on the basis of the more abstract metrics alone. Having appraised the overall situation using the higher-level metrics, the programmer should 'drill down' to the lower-level ones to understand the particular security issues affecting the program in question. Our software tool makes it easy to do this.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section demonstrates the validity of our security assessment model empirically. Firstly, we developed a program capable of calculating security metrics from compiled Java bytecode at all of the abstraction levels described above. An example of its output is shown in Figure 2 . It lists each of the metrics at all four levels and displays the design principles metrics graphically.
Our hypothesis for testing the metrics is that related programs, developed for similar requirements and objectives, should produce better results as bugs are fixed and the program code is improved. In other words, the program's Total Security Index should decrease, indicating more secure code, from one long patch to the next (or at least should stay stable). However, we may also reasonably expect to see an increase in the TSI, Fig. 2 . Example of Hierarchical Metrics Produced by the Java Bytecode Analyser for Apache James (1) indicating less secure code, if the program has major new functionality, and hence more potential vulnerabilities, added.
A. Approach
We conducted our experiment on five large-scale open source Java programs. We used our Java bytecode analyser to assess the relative security of different versions of the same program, since this makes the results meaningfully comparable. (Comparing the relative security of totally unrelated programs would not be informative, unless they were intended to implement exactly the same security-critical functions.) The chosen projects were all security-related, so we could reasonably expect successive releases to be more secure than their predecessors. The projects were selected from the most often downloaded security projects on the SourceForge website [17] . A list of the open source programs was taken from Java Source [18] which provides some descriptions about different Java open source programs. For each project, we chose a specific version which was modified in a number of subsequent updates, to fix bugs found in the previous releases. In this way we could compare different versions of each program with identical functionality but (hopefully) improved code quality.
B. The Programs Analysed
The chosen programs consisted of the following: Apache James (two different programs) (releases 2.0.0, 2. Apache James was developed by the Apache Software Foundation to be a Java SMTP and POP3 Mail server and NNTP News server [19] . Jackcess is designed to work as a Java library for reading from and writing to MS Access databases [18] . ACEGI is a security program designed to provide applications with comprehensive authentication, authorization, instance-based access control, channel security and human user detection capabilities [18] . JGroups provides several features mainly related to multicast communications using several networking transport protocols (e.g., TCP) [18] . 
C. Program Annotations
To let our bytecode analyser know which data values were considered security-critical we first needed to annotate the programs to identify their 'classified' data fields. We manually labelled a number of attributes in each project as 'classified', choosing attributes whose names and associated code comments indicated that they are most likely to store confidential data. We labelled the same attributes for each different release of the same program in order to make our comparisons meaningful.
For example, in the first release of Apache James, we annotated the following attributes as classified: userName, password and algorithm in the userDefault class. In addition to these attributes, we also labelled the following as classified in the later releases (2.2.0 onwards): fieldPassword and fieldUser in the Account class. With regard to the SQL Jackcess project, we annotated two different attributes as classified: SID and RESERVEDWORDS in the Database class. In the ACEGI project, we annotated three different attributes in two different classes to be classified: username and password in the ComparisonAttribute class, and password in the userAttribute class. In the JGroups project we chose the following attributes to be treated as classified: id and xid in the Xid class.
D. Analysis of Experimental Results
Given that lower values of each metric are considered more secure, programs whose metrics decrease are considered to have improved. We expected that these security-related programs would increase their security with each new release, except when significant new functionality has been added.
The results of applying our tool to each release of each project are summarised here for each of the four levels in Figure 1 . The lowest level is the metrics for classified data flow (Table I) . Given the large number of these metrics, we only present a representative example here. Table V shows the results for Apache James, versions 2.0.0 to 2.1.3. In these tables a downwards arrow indicates the metric has decreased (i.e., security has improved) since the previous release, an upwards arrow says that the metric has increased (i.e., security has worsened), and a right-pointing arrow means there has been no change to this particular metric. The results for Apache James (1) show that a large number of its lowest level metrics have increased in the second version when compared to the initial one. This is due to the increase of the total number of classified attributes and methods (as evidenced by the CAT and CMT counts). This indicates that new securitycritical code was added to the program which has caused these metrics to increase, meaning that overall program security has gotten worse. However, the security metrics of the following two versions (i.e., 2.1.1 and 2.1.2) have managed either to decrease or stay stable which indicates an improvement in the overall security of the program. (No new security-critical code was added in these versions.) With regard to the last version, most of the metrics have decreased apart from those associated with measuring the proportion of classified methods which interact with classified attributes and number of critical classes (e.g. CCC, UCAM and CDP). Similarly detailed sets of data flow metrics were produced for the other four programs.
At the next level of abstraction are the readability and writability security metrics as shown in Tables VI to X for all five programs. Overall, most of the programs show a general improvement in their security metrics from one version to the next. This includes the results for Apache James (1), versions 2.0.0 to 2.1.3. The only exception in this program is some of the readability and writability security metrics for the second release since this release introduced new securitycritical features as mentioned previously, as clearly shown by the SAM metric. Another obvious exception is Apache James (2), versions 2.2.0 to 2.3.2, where only one metric (i.e. SAM) in version 2.3.0 has increased due to newly added securitycritical code as well. However, the remainder of the metrics for both Apache programs decrease as the programs evolve, revealing an expected improvement in overall security.
One obviously exceptional program for the readability and writability security metrics is Jackcess (Table VIII) which has shown an increase in the metrics associated with classified methods. This is clearly shown in the program's WCM metric which has increased every time SAM increased. This is due to new classified methods since both WCM and SAM are related to measuring readability and writability via classified methods. However, once the program stabilises, its security metrics decrease. This is clearly shown in the last two versions by a decrease in the security metric SAM indicating that there are no new security-critical features introduced, allowing an improvement in overall security. This also applies to ACEGI (Table IX) versions 1.2 to 1.5 with the exception of the last version (i.e., ACEGI 1.5) where two security metrics have increased. This version has worsen security with regard to its WCM and RCC metrics. Since the absolute SAM metric has not changed from its predecessor, this suggests that no security-critical code has been added to the program, so some non security-critical code must have been removed from the program increasing the relative proportion of critical code. This was confirmed by inspecting the program which showed that there was a decrease in the total number of non-critical classes. The program used to consist of 413 classes and in the last version it only contains 404. By contrast, the JGroups programs (Table X) show the most atypical result in this experiment as most of the security metrics continued to increase as the program evolved. The main reason for this is clearly shown by the SAM metrics which indicate that there is a significant increase in the number of security-critical features. For example, the data flow metrics of the JGroups 2.3 and 2.4 releases show that the number of classified attributes, i.e., those into which classified values may flow, has increased from 160 attributes in JGroups 2.3 to 208 classified attributes in JGroups 2.4.
At the third level of abstraction we have metrics for the security design principles as shown in Tables XI to XV. For instance, with respect to the security design principles of granting least privilege (PLP) and securing the weakest link (PSWL), the results in Tables XI to XV show that Apache James version 2.3.2 is the version which best satisfies these principles. For reducing the attack surface size (PRAS), Apache James version 2.0.0 is the version which best meets this requirement. Apache James version 2.0.0 also has the lowest metrics for readability of the program's classified attributes and methods. This means that it is also the best with regard to the principle of fail-safe defaults (PFSD). For the design principle of the least common mechanism (PLCM), ACEGI version 1.1 best adheres to this principle. For the security design principle of isolation (PI), Jackcess version 1.1 is best. For economy of mechanism (PEM), which means minimising the amount of critical data, the ACEGI programs are the best among all the programs with regard to this absolute measure.
Finally, the top of our hierarchy is the Total Security Index. As shown in Table XVI , for most cases the results confirm our intuition that in general the security of the programs should improve as they evolve. For instance, both Apache James programs improve their security in all revisions of its code base except for their second one where a large amount of new code was added. The major exception is JGroups whose TSI shows a net increase indicating that its total security has worsened. This overall increase in TSI was primarily due to the security-critical functionality added in later releases. The other exception is ACEGI which has undergone a number of significant changes that affect security. Release ACEGI 1.0RC1 decreased the number of its classified methods while ACEGI 1.1 increased them by twelve. However, once the number of classified methods stabilised, the following releases showed the expected steady improvement in security until the last one which had a slight increase in the amount of interactions between methods and classified attributes.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a new hierarchical security assessment model which provides a simple and transparent approach for assessing the security of object-oriented programs at various levels of abstraction. The model takes into account lowlevel characteristics of an object-oriented program's design, such as data encapsulation and cohesion, in order to measure higher-level characteristics such as the readability and writability of security-critical data. These are then grouped to define another set of metrics which match the security design principles widely promoted in the literature. Finally, these values are used to quantify the overall security of the program of interest as a single metric.
This assessment can provide software developers with a simple way of comparing different versions of a program from the perspectives of classified data confidentiality and integrity. We have validated the model on several large-scale programs. For this purpose, we developed a tool which extracts the metrics from compiled Java bytecode automatically. The case study analysed multiple versions of five programs to see how their security level changed. All of these programs had security-critical data which needs to be protected. The results matched our intuitions about the way a program's security changes as its code is either debugged, which should improve security, or extended, which may make security worse.
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